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ABSTRACT 
China is one of the largest creditors of Latin American and the Caribbean and has loaned the region 
more than $125 billion since 2005. However, the composition of China’s financing in the region 
has been concentrated in commodity related sectors that are currently on the decline. This policy 
brief notes the extent to which Chinese finance is concentrated in new green economy sectors, and 
finds that China is not taking full opportunity of the potential in this sector. Moreover, as the global 
commodity boom has declined, much of China’s investments in the region have been exposed to 
significant risk, including prominent environmental and social risks. Despite great strides whereby 
the Chinese government has established a series of guidelines on greening overseas investment 
over the last few years, China’s development banks and companies are lacking the policies and 
staffing to identify and fully mitigate such risks. This policy brief reviews the green profile of Chinese 
development finance in LAC and analyzes environment related risks and policies for Chinese 
overseas investment. It also outlines the opportunities of green finance in LAC and how blending 
instruments can mobilize green financial flows that are beneficial for both China and LAC. 
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2China is leader in development finance for LAC 
In less than one decade, China has made itself leader in development finance for Latin      America 
and the Caribbean (LAC). Two Chinese policy banks: China Development Bank (CDB) and The 
Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM) have provided upwards of $125 billion in development 
finance to LAC since 2005 (see Gallagher and Myers, 2016). China’s commitments also helped 
fill a finance gap left by the World Bank and other International Financial institutions in the region 
(Yuan and Gallagher, 2015). For instance, in 2015, Chinese policy bank finance to LAC reached 
$29 billion to LAC, surpassing their 2014 lending by 19 billion, and also exceeded World Bank 
(WB), Inter-American Development Bank and CAF-Development Bank of Latin America finance 
to the region combined (Figure 1). 
In additional to development loans, China has also announced several regional funds to 
deepen the cooperation with LAC including China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund 
($10 billion for phase one), the Special Loan Program for China-LAC Infrastructure Project ($20 
billion) and China-LAC Cooperation Fund ($10-15 billion) (Myers, Gallagher and Yuan, 2015). 
Figure 1: Development Finance to LAC 2007-15
Source: Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2015) 
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3Every year, development banks operating in LAC1 including Chinese policy banks provide 
about 1% of annual GDP finance to support governments’ development agenda in various sectors: 
Governance and social development (33%), Green finance (20%), conventional infrastructure 
(28%), conventional energy (14%), finance (10%), education and health (5%) (figure 2, left 
side). However, compared to their peers, Chinese policy banks finance is strongly skewed toward 
conventional energy and infrastructure projects, which accounted for more than half of their finance 
to LAC. As a consequence, green finance only has a share of 9% in Chinese finance to the region. 
Figure 2: Development Finance to LAC by sector 2007-14
              All Development Banks             Chinese Policy Banks
Source: Yuan, Fei and Kevin P Gallagher (2015)
Green finance in LAC
Using the green finance tracking methodology by the International Development Finance 
Club (IDFC), a network of national and sub-regional development banks including the CDB, we 
estimate that during 2007-14 approximately $61 billion of development finance to LAC directly 
and/or indirectly supported climate mitigation, adaptation, water and sanitation projects and can 
be labeled as “green”. About 70% of the green finance came from IDB, World Bank and CAF. Two 
Chinese banks provided about $7 billion green finance to LAC governments between 2007-2014, 
about 12% of the total green finance the region received from eleven major development banks 
1  Development banks operating in LAC include traditional multilateral development banks (World Bank, Inter-
American Development Bank), regional development banks (CAF-Development Bank of Latin America, Caribbean 
Development Bank, European Development Bank) and national development banks (Export-Import Bank of the US, 
Agence Française de Développement, KfW Development Bank, Brazilian Development Bank, China Development 
Bank, China Export Import Bank). 
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4operating in LAC. In terms of absolute volume, the lending of two Chinese banks is similar to 
that of two European banks: KfW and AFD (figure 3); however, if we look at green finance as a 
percentage of total finance, the numbers of CDB (4%) and CHEXIM (22%) are relatively small.
Figure 3: Ranking International Development Banks for Green Finance 2007-14
Source: Yuan, Fei and Kevin P Gallagher (2015)
Regarding the composition of green finance in LAC, climate change mitigation projects 
received the bulk of the finance (39%), followed by water and sanitation (33%), climate change 
adaption (11%) and hydropower plants (17%). It is important to highlight that, according to the 
IDFC definition, hydropower plants can be labeled green, “only if net emission reductions can be 
demonstrated.” Indeed, if none of the hydro projects were counted, there would be just over $4 
billion in cleaner energy finance-relative to the $14.6 billion including hydropower.
In fact, hydroelectric projects in LAC, especially those in tropical areas, have long been 
associated with increases in methane emissions and emissions from deforestation. Studies even 
have shown that tropical hydropower plants tend to emit 7 to 15 times more emissions than non-
tropical hydropower due to infrastructure expansion (Barro et al, 2011; Steinhurst et al, 2012). For 
instance, it is estimated that the planned hydroelectric dams along Brazil’s Tapajos Rivers will 
indirectly trigger the deforestation of 950,00 hectares by 2032 as these new dams will spur the 
establishment of extensive new roads and infrastructure through the Amazon forest (Laurance et 
al, 2015).
Beyond emissions contributing to climate change, hydroelectric power plants have also 
been shown to be the source of other environmental and social problems such as loss of water, 
biodiversity and habit, involuntary resettlement, displacement of local and indigenous livelihoods, 
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5etc. If these potential risks are not well mitigated, it might result in massive protests and destruction, 
and in turn, lead to delayed projects and huge economic loss. Hence, there is always controversy 
surrounding the sustainability and “greenness” of hydroelectric projects. If hydroelectric projects 
were not included in China’s green investment profile to LAC, Chinese finance in the region would 
be among the least green of all development banks operating in the region. 
Specifically, in the case of Chinese green finance in LAC, hydroelectric projects have a 
dominant share of 93%, with another 4% in sustainable transport and 3 % in renewable energy. 
Indeed, concerns have been raised over hydroelectric projects financed by Chinese banks. For 
example, the Coca-Coda Sinclair project, on one hand is to be credited for increasing the amount 
of renewable energy in Ecuador’s power supply; However, on the other hand, the dam will partly 
dry Ecuador’s largest waterfall, the San Rafael Falls which is located in the UNEXO Sumaco 
Biosphere Reserve (International Rivers, 2015). 
Table 1: Chinese ‘green’ projects in LAC 2007-14 
Country Year Lender Project
Amount 
(USD Million)
Argentina 2014
CDB (with ICBC 
and BOC)
The Nestor Kirchner& Jorge Cepernic dam
4,700 (2,499 by 
CDB)
Ecuador 2011 CDB
Delsitanisagua, Mazar-Dudas, Bulu Bulu 
hydroelectric dams
680
Ecuador 2014 CHEXIM
Finance the power transmission system for 
Coca-Codo-Sinclair hydropower plant
509
Ecuador 2013 CHEXIM Minas-San Francisco hydroelectric dam 312
Ecuador 2010 CHEXIM Coca-Codo-Sinclair hydroelectric dam 1,683
Ecuador 2010 CHEXIM Sopladora hydroelectric dam 571
Argentina 2012 CDB Renewable energy projects 200
Argentina 2014 CHEXIM Purchase 150 cars for Metro Line A 162
Costa Rica 2012 CDB
Replace public transportation vehicles to 
use more eco-friendly fuels
101
Source: Gallagher, Kevin P. and Margaret Myers (2015) 
Regarding investment destinations, Chinese green investments are highly concentrated in 
Argentina and Ecuador, except a small sustainable infrastructure loan to Costa Rica in 2013. The 
Nestor Kirchner & Jorge Cepernic hydro project at a cost of 4.7 billion, jointly financed by CDB, 
ICBC and BOC has been the largest Chinese green project in LAC. CHEXIM have financed several 
hydropower projects in Ecuador, including the Coca-Codo-Sinclair dam, Minas-San Francisco 
dam and Sopladora dam. In addition, the EXIM bank also provided a loan of $162 million to the 
city of Buenos Aires for purchasing metro cars, while CDB granted a loan to the BICE bank of 
6Argentina to support renewable projects. 
Environmental Safeguards in LAC  
Development bank projects, regardless of whether they are “green” or “conventional”, could 
generate negative impacts if environmental and social risks are not fully mitigated and well 
managed. These impacts can lead to project delay, modification and even cancellation, which in 
turn, will cause huge economic loss and harm the reputation of investors. Chinese investments in 
LAC are all exposed to these risks, especially those projects located in environmentally sensitive 
areas. For instance, figure 4 shows that China has a number of infrastructure, mining and oil 
projects undergoing and planned in the Amazon, the most biodiverse and indigenous areas in 
LAC (Ray et al, 2015). In fact, in 2012 Bolivia revoked a highway project through the Amazon 
rainforest financed by the Brazilian National Development Banks (BNDES) due to the massive 
protests from indigenous people (Achtenberg, 2012), putting millions of dollars in jeopardy. 
Several oil concessions and the potential transcontinental railway that China is interested in will 
become megaprojects once finalized. To successfully implement these projects and well protect 
investors’ interests, it is essential to apply appropriate environmental assessments and community 
consultations in early stages of project planning. 
7Figure 4: China in the Amazon
Source: Ray, Rebecca and Kevin Gallagher (2015). 
Unfortunately, the current safeguard policies of CDB and CHEXIM on paper might not be 
comprehensive or strong enough to protect their investments from those environmental and social 
risks. Compared to other development banks, Chinese banks adopt a “deferential recognition” 
approach to safeguard policies. They use country systems as project compliance standards and 
less often impose international standards and/or best practices on host countries (Table 3). For 
example, in their policy documents, CDB and CHEXIM do not require project-level grievance 
mechanism and independent monitoring and review. In addition, public consultation with affected 
communities is not addressed by CDB either. 
8Table 3: Global Development Bank Safeguards
The advantage of deferential recognition is to save assessment costs and time in the initial 
design and planning stages, but this approach might increase uncertainties and risks for project 
implementation. Nevertheless, when World Bank and other multilateral development banks require 
all the projects comply with a set of international standards and procedures, they also receive 
strong critics because their environmental and social safeguards are perceived as contributes to 
project delay and impositions on borrowing countries (Yuan and Gallagher, 2015). 
Nature of 
safeguards Characteristics International Development Banks 
Conditional 
Harmonization 
*Conditional thematic, operational and 
procedural standards  
*Performs compliance work itself 
and/or provides technical assistance  
World Bank 
European Development Bank 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Export-Import Bank of the US 
Capability 
Enhancing 
Recognition 
*Recognizes borrowing country 
standards  
*Ensures project compliance with 
country systems and some international 
standards 
*Provides technical assistance to meet 
standards  
CAF-Development Bank of Latin 
America 
KfW Development Bank 
Agence Française de Développement 
Caribbean Development Bank 
Deferential 
Recognition 
*Recommends that projects comply 
with national country systems  
*Seldom ensures compliance or assists 
in meeting standards  
The Brazilian Development Bank 
China Development Bank 
Export-Import Bank of China 
 
9Table 4: Operational Procedures Requirements 
Source: Fei Yuan and Gallagher, Kevin P Gallagher (2015). 
The relationship between the harmonization level of safeguards and the costs and time of project 
preparation can be illustrated in an equilibrium graph (figure 5). There is a trade-off between costs 
and risks, and banks need to balance these factors to maximize their benefits, both economic and 
social. Having high levels of safeguards may reduce the level of uncertainty relative to a project, 
but may be overly costly in terms of time to completion.  Solely relying on country systems can 
be equally costly however, as the level of uncertainty due to social protest, environmental cost, 
and cost overruns is high. ‘Capability enhancing recognition’ is a strategy that attempts to balance 
the two, and may be the next step for China’s banks. Here, banks like CAF and KfW have chosen 
to recognize country systems while also promote and help borrowing countries to meet some 
international standards, which could be more practical in terms of cost and benefit. 
 	 World	
Bank	
IADB	 US	
EXIM	
AFD	 KFW	 EIB	 CAF	 CaDB	 CHEX
IM	
BND
ES	
CDB	
Ex-ante	Environmental	Impact	
Assessments	
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Project	Review	of	
Environmental	Impact	
Assessments	
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Industry-specific	Social	and	
Environmental	Standards	
X	 X	 X	 -	 -	 -	 X	 -	 - X - 
Require	Compliance	with	Host	
Country	Regulations	
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Require	Compliance	with	Int’l	
Environmental	Regulations	
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Public	Consultations	with	
Affected	Communities	
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 -	 -	
Project	Level	Grievance	
Mechanism	
X	 -	 -	 X	 -	 X	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Independent	Monitoring	and	
Review	
X	 -	 X	 -	 -	
	
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	
Establishing	Covenants	Linked	
to	Compliance	
X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X	
Ex-post	Environmental	Impact	
Assessments	
-	 -	 -	 X	 -	 X	 X	 X	 X	 -	 X	
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Figure 5: Safeguarding risks 
However, whereas China’s banks and firms have weaker safeguards on paper, recent studies 
have shown that in some cases, projects financed by Chinese banks perform better respect to 
environmental and social safeguards. (Ray et al, 2015). In fact, China has put great efforts into 
greening its banking system. In 2012, CBRC issued the Green Credit Guidelines providing clear 
operational guidance to implement green banking in three aspects: E&S risk management, green 
lending products and services, and greening banks’ own operations. Targeting for overseas projects, 
MOFCOM and MEP jointly released “The Guideline of Environment Protection for Overseas 
Investment and Cooperation. This guideline articulates that “the banking institutions shall make 
promise in public that appropriate international norms will be followed as far as such overseas 
projects are concerned, so as to ensure alignment with good international practices (MOFCOM, 
2013).”
This top-down approach has generated some impacts on the banking sector of China. For 
instance, China Development Bank has chaired the Special Committee of Green Credit, China 
Banking Association, which has the aim to enhance banks’ capacity of integrating environmental and 
social sustainability in banking operations. We were also told by CDB staff that “green screening” 
had been embedded in every procedure of their operations, although no detailed document could 
be disclosed. They also mentioned that banks had received pressure on increasing green credit and 
greening their operations from the cetral bank, CBRC, etc. 
11
Nevertheless, banking practitioners also expressed their concerns and difficulties in following 
the guidelines. The major obstacles include lack of implementation instruments and being 
short of for example, professional staff in green finance. Some progress has been made in the 
implementation regard. CBRC launched the Green Credit Statistics System in 2014 and classified 
green credit loans into 12 categories with sub-categories. In 2015, CBRC further introduced the 
Green Credit Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to strengthen monitoring and evaluation of green 
banking. However, unlike most Western banks, the vast majority of Chinese banks still do not have 
professional staff working on environmental issues, which directly affects the quality of safeguard 
impementation.
In fact, in China, overseas business involves more institutions other than banks, companies and 
contractors. Before 2014, Measures for Overseas Investment Management required all business 
activities to be approved MOFCOM, NDRC and SAFE before they “went”. To get the approval, 
investors were requested to submit detailed project information including assessment of business 
environment. Once had the paper, investors could apply for loans and sign contract with their 
business partners. To improve institutional efficiency, this directive has been simplified since 2014 
as investors only have to register online for their overseas activities and do not need to wait for the 
approval, except for very few cases that involve protected industries and technologies. 
This simplification on one hand promotes overseas investment by reducing bureaucratic 
procedures; on the other hand, it transfers more responsibility to investors and banks. Not 
surprisingly, many Chinese investors are not capable of well managing their business risks, 
especially the environmental and social ones, even though they are aware of the consequences. The 
Measures for Overseas Investment Management require all investors to “comply with host country’s 
regulations, respect local customs, fulfill social responsibility and protect environment, labor and 
promote local integration.” In regard to environmental and social issues, based on our interviews, 
most investors do conduct independent EIAs following host country’s regulations. However, if 
projects are located in environmentally sensitive and/or indigenous territories, the complexity of 
interacting with local stakeholders is usually underestimated due to limited understanding of local 
community and culture. For example, there has been relentless protests from local people against 
the Las Bambas mining projects in Peru, owned by China Minmetals, despite the fact that the 
project has all required environmental documents. The shut down of mining operations has caused 
the loss of millions of dollars. In addition, influenced by their domestic experiences, Chinese 
companies tend to address business related concerns and conflicts with governments instead of 
local communities, which in a lot of cases increases the discontent of affected people. 
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Seizing the Green Finance Opportunities
The demand for power in LAC will triple by 2050, as a result of population growth and 
improvements in quality of life. This requires the region to double its installed power at a cost 
of approximately 430 billion dollars (Vergara et al, 2013a). Hopefully, along with the anticipated 
expansion of demand, the power sector will continue to decarbonize the current power matrix. It 
is projected that coal and oil will disappear from LAC’s energy matrix by 2050, even under the 
business-as-usual scenario (Figure 6) and natural gas will become the primary energy source, 
supplemented by hydropower. However, to achieve the 2 degrees Celsius goal, LAC countries need 
to reduce the current emissions levels by 40% (Vergara et al, 2013b). Furthermore, the region also 
has to curb the reliance on hydropower as the output is highly vulnerable to hydrologic alterations 
resulted from climate change. Fortunately, LAC has abundant renewable energy resources which 
allow it to diversify the power matrix through non-hydro renewable technologies: solar, wind, 
geothermal, advanced bio-energy and improvements in energy efficiency. In fact, exploiting 4% 
of the available technical potential can meet the full electricity demand by 2050 (Vergara et al, 
2013a). 
Figure 6: LAC Power Matrix 
Electricity generation in Latin America in 2010 Projected Evolution of LAC Power Mix to 2050
Author’s calculation based on IEA 2010, World Energy 
Balances 
Author’s calculation based on GEA Scenario database
However, although the costs of non-hydro renewable energies have been constantly 
decreasing and become a cost-effective option in many cases, in times of economic contraction, 
LAC governments are less likely to increase investment in renewable energies due to more fiscal 
constraints. From the perspective of private sectors, low-emission energy is always perceived 
risker and financially less attractive as long as fossil fuel subsidies exist. Hence, financing renewable 
energy projects is still challenging for many countries in LAC despite of the high demand and 
market potential.
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On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the story is quite different. China has been the largest 
investor in clean energy in the world for years. In 2015, China spent a record of $111 billion on 
clean energy infrastructure, as much as the US and the EU combined (Randall, 2016). At the same 
time, Chinese wind and solar energy installations both surpassed their old records. Nevertheless, 
partially due to the economic slowdown, China’s National Energy Administration has set a lower 
target for new solar PV capacity for 2016 (Clover, 2015). The clean energy sector will also 
encounter the overcapacity problem in the near future as many other sectors in China and need to 
look for new markets. 
In fact, LAC could be a promising market for Chinese low-carbon energy investors if a set 
of appropriate development financial instruments are provided. In the current project finance 
structure, lower outputs and policy distortions (subsidies, tax incentives or trade restrictions) are 
primary factors that constitute the financial viability gap of clean energy projects. Taking a wind 
farm case as an example, the project has a present value of revenues of $60 million and present 
value of costs of $170 million, leaving a viability gap of $110 million. This gap can be balanced by 
rebalancing policy distortions and monetizing the reduction of GHG emissions and air pollution 
(Figure 7). 
Excitingly, financing green finance projects is completely feasible by exploring the existing 
development financial resources between China and LAC. Figure 8 shows one financing solution 
that MOFCOM/MOFA and/or South-South Climate Fund provide support for adjusting policy 
distortions and introducing market mechanism of GHG emissions, while banks and region-wide 
funds finance the clean energy infrastructure and technologies through loans. If this does happen, 
China and LAC will successfully achieve the green production capacity cooperation, which will 
be extremely significant for bilateral cooperation in the “New Normal”. 
14
Figure 7: Green Finance for a Wind Energy Project 
Source: AUTHOR’S CALCULATIONS BASED ON World Bank (2012) 
Figure 8: Blending Instruments for Green Finance from China to LAC
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Interestingly, China could finance some of these projects through its growing green bond 
market. Although China’s share in green finance in LAC is relatively small, its domestic green 
credit market has dramatically expanded in recent years. China started to build the green credit 
framework in 2007, and according to China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the balance 
of green credit reached ￥6 trillion (about $950 billion) by 2014 in broad terms (CBRC, 2015). To 
further mobilize financial resources toward sustainable development, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC) and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) consecutively released 
Green Financial Bond Directive by the end of 2015 and early 2016. To date, Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank Co. and China Industrial Bank have issued green bonds of ￥20 billion and 
￥10 billion respectively. Prior to that, Agriculture Bank of China raised $1 billion through green 
bonds listed on the London Stock Exchange in October 2015.
Green bonds are defined as “bonds or debt securities specifically issued to finance 
environmental protection, sustainability or specific climate mitigation and adaptation measures 
(Climate Bond Initiative, 2014).” Projects in areas including energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
climate change, water and sanitation, and sustainable urban development all can be financed by 
the capital mobilized by green bonds. Since the financial features and yields of green bonds are 
identical to normal ones, they can significantly crowd-in private capital in green investments. The 
European Investment Bank (EIB) issued the world’s first green bonds in 2007 with a value of €600 
million. In 2008, the World Bank issued its own green bonds. In the later years, more multilateral 
and national development banks have started to issue their green bonds and corporates have also 
joined the market since 2013. By the end of 2015, $95 billion green bonds had been issued globally. 
China has a 6 trillion bond market, the third largest in the world. Considering the high demand 
for green finance and the huge potential in China’s bond market, “China could become a major 
green bond issuer in the World” as Ma Jun, the chief economist of PBoC indicated (Bloomberg, 
2016). Indeed, CDB is also considering issuing its first green bond in the near future and the 
issuance value might hit a new record given the fact that CDB is one of the largest bond issuer 
in China. Furthermore, the New Development Bank has raised $450 million (¥ 3 billion) through 
RMB denominated green bonds in last July to finance green projects in BRICS countries (Sputnik, 
2016).
New financial flows opened by green bonds will be essential to tackling climate change (World 
Bank, 2015). However, no bank or financial institution in LAC has issued green bonds, despite 
an increasing demand for sustainable development. If a Chinese bank or corporate finances its 
investment in LAC through green bonds, it will bring new dynamics to the bilateral cooperation. 
16
Conclusion 
China may possess the best tool kit for green finance in the world economy. China’s policy 
banks are well capitalized and experienced in providing overseas finance that offer benefits to both 
creditor and borrower countries. What is more, China has numerous institutions it can draw from 
that could blend instruments to green financial flows. After 15 years of implementing the “go out” 
strategy, two Chinese policy banks have become indispensable lenders for LAC governments and 
can reposition themselves to be leading financiers of a greener. There are indications that China 
will sustain the leadership in development finance in LAC in the next few years as World Bank 
and IDB continue reducing their commitments to the region due to the region’s gloomy economic 
outlook and China needs overseas markets to export its production capacity. The available financial 
sources are promising for LAC and can play a significant role in reviving the economy if they are 
deployed in a strategic way. 
China’s development finance in LAC has demonstrated a demand-driven pattern. The majority 
of finance supported strategic infrastructure and energy projects in borrowing countries. However, 
this approach can be very risky for both sides. For LAC countries, reliance on natural resources 
and extractives-linked infrastructure will further peg the region’s economy to the commodity 
cycle that has restricted LAC’s development for decades. For Chinese investors, in the unique 
political and social context of LAC, investment can be easily in jeopardy if risks such as social 
and environmental risk are not adequately addressed and mitigated. The current safeguard systems 
of CDB and CHEXIM need to be upgraded in order to protect their overseas investment from 
potential risks. Although China Banking Regulatory Commission issued Green Credit Guidelines 
to address environment-related concerns in overseas investment, most banks and companies still 
lack the capacity to manage such risks. With increasing focus on the “going out” strategy, more 
and more Chinese companies will look for overseas opportunities and need more than guidance to 
make profitable investments. 
17
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